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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE O,F UTAH
J. HENSLEY COTTRELL,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

Case No. 8396

GRAND UNION T'EA COMPANY,
a corporation, and C. E. POPE,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

I.

AMPLIFYING PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS

Since the vital issue in this action is whether the
Findings of Fact and Judgment (R 229-230) are supported by the evidence the defendants desire to set out
in some detail the evidence bearing on the issue of a
full disclosure to Salt Lake County Attorney of all the
material facts bearing on the prosecution of the criminal
action of embezzlement against the plaintiff.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
This evidence w,as given 1n the testimony of defendant, C. E. Pope, called as the first witness by the
plaintiff, and Hal Taylor, Deputy County Attorney, and
Bernard N. Fives, witness for the defendants.
l\1:r. Pope testified that in the latter part of November or first part of December, 1953, he contacted Mr.
Hal Taylor in the County Attorney's office (R 16 and 17)
and furnished documents .and gave information to 1\tfr.
Taylor regarding any violation of the criminal laws by
the plaintiff, Mr. Cottrell.
On the first meeting with the County Attorney, Mr.
Pope, who was then accompanied by Mr. Fives, spent
approximately one hour's time explaining the shortage
in plaintiff's account and left documents herein designated as Exhibits 2, 3 and 5 with Mr. Taylor and also
showed a number of supporting documents to him (R 17
and 18). Exhibit 2 is the Remittance Report made out
by plaintiff in his own hand writing showing a shortage
of approximately $70.00; Exhibit 3, Auditor's Report
and Exhibit 5 is a summary of figures furnished to defendants by plaintiff, (R 19 and 20).
1\tfr. Pope stated that in this conversation he gave
Mr. Taylor a full resume as to his company's set-up
and operations as it affected plaintiff's employment
with it, (R 22).
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After this discussion, Mr. Taylor wanted a copy
of the contract of employment of the plaintiff, Exhibit
1, and the cash bond furnished by plaintiff, Exhibit 4,
(R 23).
These documents were taken to Mr. Taylor some
three or four days later and a further conversation took
place for about an hour in which a full explanation was
made of Exhibits 1 and 4, (R 24). 11:r. Pope also told
1Ir. Taylor that plaintiff vvas required to abide by the
contract, (R 25), and that he (Pope) had been told by
1V1r. Fives that Mr. Cottrell had been visited twice by
~lr. Fives, but just when these visits were made he did
not know.
On this second visit, after Mr. Taylor had received
all the documents and reviewed the evidence, he advised
1fr. Pope that there was probable cause that the plaintiff was guilty of embezzlement and prepared the
cri1ninal complaint charging embezzlement, which was
signed by Pope, (R 31).
Mr. G. I-Ial Taylor, Deputy County Attorney, testified that he was now engaged in the private practice
of the law, but that in the latter part of 1953 he was
a deputy in the office of Salt Lake County Attorney,
(R 139).
He testified that he recalled the visit of Mr. Pope
to the county attorney's office, but was not sure as to
the date after the period of time between then and the
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date of the trial. He recalled that on Mr. Pope's first
visit with him he was accompanied by Mr. B. W. Fives,
(R 140-141). He remembered seeing and studying documents, particularly exhibits 2, 3 and 5, and discussing
the matter of plaintiff's shortage with the defendant
company for some time in order that he might get all
the facts, (R 142).
He stated that Mr. Pope showed him sustaining
documents to the above stated exhibits and that he
desired further inforn1ation and documents and that
later, Mr. Pope returned, this time alone, bringing
further documents, including the contract and cash bond
Exhibits 1 and 4, (R 143).
After reviewing all docu1nents and discussing the
situation thoroughly on these two occasions, Mr. Taylor
testified as follows, (R 143) by Mr. Watson:

"Q. Would you state what your conclusion was,
and what your advice to Mr. Pope

was~

A.

I was of the opinion, based on the information
submitted to me, that there was probable
cause to believe that Mr. Cottrell was guilty
of embezzlement; and at that time I prepared
the papers in a complaint charging embezzlement and also filed-

Q.

You so advised Mr. Pope of that~

A.

I advised him that was my opinion, yes.

Q.

Then you prepared the complaint, and it was
signed by Mr. Pope~

A.

That is my recollection, yes.
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Q. Do you recall, in the conversation that you
had, whether mention was made by either
Mr. Pope or Mr. Fives, that Mr. Cottrell had
reported to the Grand Union Company that
he had lost his purse, containing some of the
cash that he had collected on the route~
A.

I have discussed that matter subsequently,
and I don't have a recollection as to when that
information was given to me or by whom.
I do recall that somewhere in the proceedings
the information came to me, that Mr. Cottrell
made the claim that he had lost the money.
When, I don't know.

Q. Do you rec,all what your reply was to that,
as to what effect that would have, if any~
A.

At the time of the discussion we had Exhibit
2, which indicated that certain checks had
been remitted, and cash had not, and I was

of the opinion that, in view of that, there
w,as sufficient evidence to go to the jury on
the question as to whether the money was lost,
or not, and that it would be an affirmative
defense, and did not change my mind in regard to the filing of the complaint.

Q.

That is, that would be a defense the plaintiff
himself would have to set up~

A. Yes."
Then on cross-examination by Mr King, Mr. Taylor
stated th.at he desired to see and study the contract and
other documents to obtain all the information possible
and determine from the contract that a truster-trustee
relationship existed between Mr. Cottrell and Grand
lTnion Company, (R 148), and that the money which Mr.
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Cottrell had belonged not to him, but to Grand Union
Company. He testified that there was some v.ariance in
practice between the exact terms of the contract and the
way it was handled which was that the company permitted the route salesman, (l\fr. Cottrell) to deduct his
expenses and son1e other items, rather than remitting the
gross, (R 150).
Mr. Taylor's Testimony in direct and cross-examination summarized shows that on the two visits to him by
Mr. Pope, accompanied the first time by Mr. Fives, that
all the documents pertaining to the embezzlement were
furnished and that full explanation of the entire arrangement of plaintiff's employment was 1nade prior to the
issuance of the criminal complaint with the one exception that Mr. Taylor does not recall for sure that Mr.
Cottrell sometimes remitted amounts owing to the company by checks, vouchers or money orders. Mr. Taylor
was of the opinion that there was probably cause to
believe the offense had been committed by Mr. Cottrell
and he so advised Mr. Pope to that effect and upon that
advise, l\!r. Pope signed said complaint, (R 155-156).
After thus testifying, to question by the Court relative
to how Mr. Taylor determined the an1ount of the shortage, the following testimony was given starting at line
7 of page 158 of the record :

"BY THE COURT:
Q. Then there is .a true amount that was either
embezzled, or not embezzled. Now, how did
you determine what the true amount was~
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If there is only one offense and there has been
one embezzlement, that must have been a
definite amount.
A.

From the yellow sheet. I believe it is Exhibit
2.

Q.

Did you rely upon that as the basis of the
amount of the alleged embezzlement~

A.

Yes.

Q.

And that is an amount less than .a hundred
dollars, is that right~

A.

Yes, it is $70.00, as I recall.

Q.

You had Exhibit 2, or whatever the bond is,
before you at the time you were making this
determination, is that so~

A.

I did, yes.

Q. What was the understanding that you h.ad
from the information furnished you, and an
examination of that document, as to what it
was, and what effect it had upon your problem~

A.

I concluded, finally, it had no effect on it;
that the money was taken out to protect the
company against shortages either of inadvertence or of embezzlement.

Q.

It wasn't merely an indemnity bond; it wasn't,
presented to you in that fashion, in any way..
It was an actual deposit of cash with the
company, c.ash belonging to the employee.
You knew that~

A. Yes. I think that is the effect of the bond
form.
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Q.

And you were aware that l\1r. Cottrell had on
deposit $80.00 at that time. Were you informed of that fact~

A.

I don't recall the amount. I know that there
was an amount on deposit, but I didn't-

Q.

Did they tell you the

A.

As I rec.all, they did.

Q.

Assuming, then, that amount was $80.00, was
it your opinion, and did you advise them the.
crime of embezzlement had been committed, if
Mr. Cottrell were short $7 4.00, and he had on
deposit $80.00 there, and the employment had
been terminated~

A.

I don't remember stating it just that way,
or discussing it that way.

Q.

I ,am trying to determine what information
they gave you that led you to the conclusion
that the crime had been committed~

A.

Well, I think my thinking about it was, your
Honor, that there was-I had discussed itwe generally discussed it in the office-that
the posting of the bond in the form that it was
posted, did not excuse or could it be offset
against the taking of funds that, under the
terms of the contr.act, he was still the custodian. He was still required to remit to the
company the amounts he collected, and then,
if there were an eventual shortage, after he
had remitted to the company, that the company could go against the bond to protect
themselves.
But, I didn't think that Mr. Cottrell could
offset the moneys he collected under the terms
of his contract against the bond. And, to that

amount~
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extent, and for that reason I didn't consider
the amount of the bond particularly important,
and don't recall exactly what the amounts
were. But I do recall we had a discussion
about them, and I knew he had an amount of
money on deposit.
I made no attempt to do a mathematical calculation and deduct the amount of the bond
from the $70.00, or from whatever was missing. I took the view that the amount which
was not turned in on the date indicated on
Exhibit 2, that there was probable cause to
believe that he had embezzled that amount.

Q. Did you understand that the amount that was
reflected on Exhibit 2 was the final accounting, as far as the employee went with the
company, and that there were no further
trans.actions after that?
A.

I recall they told me they were going to let
him go, or had let him go prior to the time.

Q. You were aware of the termination date?
A.

Yes, I was aware of it.

Q. l\1r. Taylor, it was your considered op1n1on
the crime of embezzlement has been committed by a person, who, under these circumstances, does not remit the sum of $70.00, and
that is the final trans.action, at such time as
the company is holding in trust for him
$80.00; and you so advised Mr. Pope?
A.

That must necessarily be the conclusion. I
don't know whether I advised him of the mat-·
ter. I finally concluded and consented to file
the complaint that was filed, and I had that
information."
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Ag.ain the court at (R. 163) inquired and the witness
testified as follows:
"THE COURT.: You said at the preliminary
hearing you became convinced that your proof
would fail. Can you elaborate on that. What
didn't you have available at the time of that
he,aring, that you had at the time you determined there v1as probable cause; or what
made you change your mind~
A.

Well, the amounts collected were collected
in small dollar and a half, two dollars, three
dollars, four dollars, and so on, and I felt
even at the time of the preliminary hearing,
that there was still probable cause, but I also
felt that supporting evidence would have to
be presented, to get a conviction, and it would
probably be necessary to call in some seventy
witnesses who had actually paid the money
to Mr. Cottrell, and then show a total shortage, before this document would be admissible.
I took the view that this document, Exhibit
2, was probably in the nature of a confession,
and that under the criminal law it would be
necessary for the State to establish the corpus delecti, or, that is, the fact that the crime
had been committed, before this document
would become admissible."

Mr. B. ,V. Fives testified that he had called upon
and found Mr. Cottrell at home on two occasions. The
first time, about November 15, 1953, Mrs. Cottrell was
also home, but in-as-much ,as Mr. Fives did not have the
records with him he was asked to come back at a later
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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date, (R. 174). On the second visit, about December 4,
1953, Mr. Cottrell was horne alone and he refused to
discuss the matter of his shortage with Mr. Fives for
the reason that 1\tfrs. Cottrell was not home although the
copies of documents were in Mr. Cottrell's files in his
horne, (R. 176 to 178).
l\1r. Fives in company with Mr. Pope called on lvfr.
Taylor at the County Attorney's office, he thought about
December 15. That at that time ~!r. Pope had an envelope full of documents which were reviewed by .and some
of them left with Mr. Taylor and he listened some to a
lengthy conversation between Mr. Pope and Mr. Taylor
following which l\1r. Taylor asked Mr. Pope if he had
some further records, to which Mr. Pope replied he had,
and that he would make them available to Mr. Taylor,
(R. 179). He then discussed with Mr. Taylor his visits
vvrith Mr. Cottrell and what the amount of the shortage
would need to be for different offenses of embezzlement,
(R. 180).
In his testimony in cross-examination he testified
he was not sure of the dates that he called upon Mr.
Taylor, but thought it was December 7, that he went there
with 11r. Pope, he thought, sometime after December 4,
(R. 183), and he stated that he heard discussion between
Mr. Taylor and 1\!Ir. Pope for the furnishing of additional
records and that Mr. Pope was to bring those at a later
date and that the

~omplaint

was not signed at the time

of the visit he attended, (R. 186-187).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANTS
ACTED HONESTLY AND IN GOOD FAITH AND MADE A
FULL AND FAIR DIS.CLOSURE OF ALL MATERIAL FACTS
KNOWN TO THEM CONCERNING THE VIOLATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW BY PLAINTIFF TO SALT LAKE COUNTY
ATTORNEY, AND THAT DEFENDANT POPE ACTED ON
ADVICE OF SAID ATTORNEY IN SIGNING THE ·COMPLAINT.
ALL OF THE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED
PRIOR TO ISSUANCE AND SIGNING OF COMPLAINT
CHARGING EMBEZZLEMENT.
(a)

(b) PROBABLE CAUSE IS DETERMINABLE BY THE
·COURT AS A MAT'TER OF LAW WHERE EVIDENCE IS
CLEAR AND UNCONTRADICTED.
POINT II.
PLAINTIF'F'S CASH BOND COULD NOT BE SET OFF
AGAINST SHORTAGE IN HIS ACCOUNT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANTS
ACTED HONESTLY AND IN GOOD FAITH AND MADE A
FULL AND FAIR DIS.CLOrSURE OF ALL MATERIAL FACTS
KNOWN TO THEM CONCERNING THE VIOLATION OF
CRIMINAL LAW BY PLAINTIFF TO SALT LAKE COUNTY
ATTORNEY, AND THAT DEFENDANT POPE ACTED ON
ADVICE OF SAID AT TORNEY IN SIGNING THE ·COMPLAINT'.
1
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ALL OF THE EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED
PRIOR TO ISSUANCE AND SIGNING OF COMPLAINT
CHARGING EMBEZZLEMENT.
(a)

(b) PROBABLE CAUSE IS DETERMINABLE BY THE
.COURT AS A MATTER OF LAW WHERE EVIDENCE IS
CLEAR AND UNCONTRADICTED.

The detailed statement of facts herein given by defendants establishes that the evidence is clear, concise
and undisputed that defendant Pope, as the local manager of defendant Grand Union Company, honestly and
in good faith made a full, fair and honest disclosure
of all the material facts known to him to Mr. Taylor,
Deputy County Attorney. Mr. Taylor's testimony is likewise definite, clear and undisputed that Mr. Pope furnished all documents required, and made full explanation of all transactions between plaintiff and defendant
Company, prior to his determination that there was
probable cause to believe that Mr. Cottrell was guilty
of the crime of embezzlen1ent and his advice to Mr. Pope
to this effect and the preparing of the complaint and
having it signed by Mr. Pope. This was also confirmed
by 1fr. Fives.
What evidence is there in the record in the case contrary to Mr. Pope's and Mr. T.aylor's testimony relative
to a full disclosure of facts to the prosecuting attorney 1
We submit there is none, and sjnce there was no other or
contradictory evidence the question of probable cause
was one of law to be decided by the court and the motion
for a directed verdict should have been granted.
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The plaintiff in his brief, page 9, states that the
memories of these witnesses were hazy as to the time
the visits were made by Pope and Fives to Thir. Taylor.
It is this matter of dates only that can in any way sho"\\r
even the slightest discrepancy in defendant's evidence .
..._t\..nd the evidence of both Pope and Taylor are unequivocal that these documents were furnished by Pope and
studied and fully understood by Mr. Taylor prior to Mr.
Taylor's determination that there was probable cause
and Mr. Pope's signing the complaint on the opinion
and advice of J\1r. T.aylor.
Also plaintiff's brief attempts to draw some inference fron1 the letter of A. W. Watson on probable cause,
Exhibit 10, see page 10, plaintiff's brief, stating that he,
l\Ir. Watson, vvas not furnished a copy of plaintiff's contract of employment .and that therefore,

~fr.

Taylor was

not furnished said copy, which is Exhibit I. Such inference is certainly not justified as it seems more logical
to assume that J\1r. Watson did not have a copy of the
contract because Mr. Pope was taking sa;id copy to Mr.
Taylor. Furthermore, Mr. Taylor definitely states his
opinion was formed .as to probable cause from his own
study of the information furnished hin1 including the employment contract and not by anything stated in Exhibit
10. Also the inference that there was a deviation from
said contract as urged by plaintiff's brief to the effect
that plaintiff was not accountable for collections made
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can not possibly be seriously considered in the light of
plaintiff's testimony that he was short in his account and
his setting forth such shortage in his final report, Exhibit

2.
Plaintiff's brief also states as a bare conclusion,
without setting forth .any evidence in support thereof,
that Mr. Taylor did not have Exhibit I before him prior
to arriving at his opinion and issuing complaint against
the plaintiff. This assertion is directly contrary to the
positive testimony of Messrs. Pope and T'aylor.
Mr. Taylor's statement that he considered the cash
bond .and that it had no effect on his determination that
the amount not accounted for by plaintiff was $70.00 or
more and the bond could not be a setoff against this
shortage, clearly proves that he had this document prior
to issuance of the criminal complaint. So also is this true
of the contract, because Mr. Taylor stated he had studied
its provisions and discussed its terms with Mr. Pope
prior to issuance of the complaint and even at the trial of
the instant case remembered the paragraph discussed as
to the provision for remittance by Cottrell. Against these
positive statements the plaintiff's brief states that these
documents were not received until after the issuance
of the complaint without setting forth the evidence in
support of said conclusion or inferences indulged in because of uncertainty as to dates of these conversations.
Is it any wonder in light of this positive evidence, which
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is uncontradicted by any other witness or testimony, that
the trial judge held that the jury's answer to question
numbered 2(a), 2(d), 2(f) ,and 2(h) and question No. 3
were not supported by the evidence.
Under such facts the cases are clear and virtually
unanimous that the trial judge should render as a matter
of law verdict in favor of defendants.
The following statement of the law found in Sec.
864 of 58 Am. Jur., Witness, is very persuasive ,as to
how the courts consider evidence.
•'The general rule that the credibility of a witness is for the jury does not mean that the jury
or the trial judge· is at liberty under the guise of
passing upon the credibility of a witness, to disregard his testimony when fron1 no reasonable
point of view is it open to doubt. The jury should
not needlessly impute perjury to a witness.
"It seems to be established as a general rule
that when ,a disinterested witness, who is in no
way discredited by other evidence, testifies as to
a fact within his knowledge and which is not itself
improbable, or in conflict with other evidence, the
witness is to be believed, and especially where his
testimony is fully cooperated."
The case of Jerke v. Delmont State Bank, (S.D.) 223
N.vV. 585, 72 A.L.R. 7 at pages 16 and 17 of 72 A.L.R.
after speaking of the functions of ,a jury states:
"It is the theory of our law that the entire
matter of a trial between parties shall be carried
on in a court of justice and under the general
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
supervision and control of the judge thereof, and
that the truth as to the facts shall be arrived at
upon a consideration of the evidence and proofs
presented by the respective parties in support
of their respective claims. The jury, in modern
law, is merely a part of the machinery of the court,
and it is the part of such ·machinery that is made
use of in proper cases for determining the truth
.as to the issuable facts. But we must not forget
that the general superintendence and control of
the court and all its machinery, including the jury,
rests with the judge, and it is fundamental that
an issue arising between litigants must be tried by
a general, rational, or reasoning process, both as
to the ascertaining of facts and the application
of the law. This has been the basic theory of the
common law ever since the rule of reason replaced
trial by orde.al and wager of battle. The existence
or nonexistence of ultimate issuable facts must be
determined from the evidence produced in court,
whether the determination is made by a judge or
by a jury, by a process of rationalization and
judgment, and by the application of the thinking
faculties of the human mind to the evidence.

"vVe are too often prone to exaggerate the
powers and privileges of a jury as a trier of facts.
We frequently see the phrase, 'It is for the Jury
to say what the f.acts are.' Historically speaking,
this may have been true in the sixteenth century,
but it has long since ceased to be true. The power
and right and duty of the jury are not 'to say what
the facts are,' but to adjudge and determine what
the facts are by the usual and ordinary intellectual
processes; that is, by applying the thinking faculties of their minds to the evidence received and the
presumptions existing in the case, if any, and
thereby forming an opinion or judgment. The
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data is the evidence received in court, and nothing
extraneous thereto should enter into the determination, except to the extent that the sum of the past
experiences of any individual always and necessarily, as a matter of psychology, enters into his
formation of judgment or opinion based upon any
given data. Before there is anything for submission to a jury, the evidence offered as to the ultimate facts must be such that the application of
normal intellectual faculties thereto might by the
customary and normal processes of reasoning arrive at different judgme,nts or conclusions. If
there is not such a state of facts a verdict should
properly be directed, inasmuch as any result but
one would not be a reasonable result, and the
direction of ,a verdict in a proper case is not only
the right of the judge, but it is his affirmative
duty, and just as much and just as proper a part
of his duty as ruling upon evidence or performing
any other judicial function."
The plaintiff must prove in order to sustain his complaint of malicious prosecution the following: (1) the
criminal prosecution of plaintiff, (2) its procurement by
defendant, (3) its termination favorable to plaintiff, (4)
lack of probable cause, ( 5) malice in the instigation of
prosecution.
The defendants maintain very strenuously that the
defendants acted honestly and in good faith and made
a full and fair disclosure of all material facts known to
them to the prosecuting attorney and that there was no
dispute as to the facts and therefore the court should
have directed a verdict for defendants.
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On this phase of the law it is stated in 34 Am.
Jur., Section 72, Malicious Prosecution, as follows:
"It is established that if, in addition to his
own belief, a defendant proves that before commencing prosecution of the criminal proceeding
complained of he sought the legal advice of an
officer selected by the people to prosecute offenders against la\vs, and in good faith fully and fairly
disclosed to that officer all the information he
possessed, and he w.as advised that a crime had
been committed, the defendant has made out a
complete defense to the action. This is true even
though the advise may have been erroneous. It
is sometin1es held that advice from a public prosecuting officer makes a stronger case, and also,
that such advice would be .a complete defense when
that of a private attorney would not. So, also,
there is authority to the effect that the individual
would be protected by the advice even though he
may not have stated facts which he could have
ascertained by re.asonable diligence, the reason being that it is the duty of the public prosecutor to
investigate charges of the commission of crime."
A very thorough and exhaustive treatise of this issue
is given in 10 A.L.R. 2d 1215.
Also, the defendants urgently request the court to
read the recent Idaho case of Thomas v. Hinton, 281 P.
2d 1050. This case gives a careful review as to when the
court should decide the case. The f.acts are analogous to
the instant case to a great extent. The trial judge failed
to grant a motion for a directed verdict or for judgment
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notwithstanding the verdict and the appellate court reversed, directing the trial court to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
At P. 1054 the case states as follows:

"* * *

There being no dispute as to the facts,
nor reasonable doubt concerning inferences drawn
therefrom, the court properly entered judgment of
nonsuit. (Cases)
"The rule would seem to be quite general that
in an action for malicious prosecution the question
of whether or not there was probable cause is determinable by the court as a matter of law unless
there is some evidence in dispute which requires
submission to the jury. (Case.)"
The rule is, when defendant leaves the matter entirely to the judgment and responsibility of the prosecuting officer after a full, fair, and honest disclosure
of the facts, he is not answerable in malicious prosecution, which rule is sustained by this court in following
cases:

McKenzie v. Canning, 42 U. 529, 131 P. 1172;
Sweatman v. Linton, 66 U. 208, 241 P. 309;
U·hr v. Eaton, 95 U. 309, 80 P. 2d 925;
McCal.l v. Kendrick, 2 U. 2d 364, 274 P. 2d
962;
Thomas v. Frost, 83 U. 207, 27 P. 2d 459;
Kennedy v. Burbidge, 54 U. 497, 183 P. 325;
Singh v. Macdonald, 55 U. 54, 188 P. 631.
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The anno. in 10 A.L.R. 2d at P. 1240 states:
''But assuming, that in seeking advice of
coun!sel, and in acting thereon, he has acted in good
faith and has disclosed all the facts within his
knowledge relating to the defense and the accusation, his defense of probable cause will be established even though the defendant should show at
the trial other facts sufficient to secure his acquittal, which might have been ascertained by prosecuting witness, if he had made diligent inquiry
therefor. It is not necessary that he shall institute
an investigation of the crime itself, or seek to ascertain other facts relating to the offense, or to
try to find out whether the accused has any defense to the charge. l-Ie is not required to exhaust
all sources of information bearing upon the facts
which have come to his knowledge, for that would
be to require him to perform the office of the committing magistrate; and thus thw.art the very
purpose of the law in inducing him to seek its
im1nediate vindication for crimes committed
against it."

Sweatman v. Linton, 66 U. 208, 24:1 P. 309 holds:
"Our court is committed to the rule that a
full and fair statement to prosecuting attorney
and acting upon the advice of such attorney that
there was probable cause is a complete and good
defense to an action for malicious prosecution
unless there is some particular evidence or circumstance, or facts, which would tend to show the
defendant's disbelief in the fact that he had probable cause."

Elmer v. Chicago N.W.R., 51 N.W. 2d 707 (Wis.):
"Criminal complaint signed by railway detective after being advised by district attorney
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upon sufficient evidence to issue complaint, the
detective having made a full and complete statement of the facts within his knowledge, w:as based
upon probable cause as a matter of law notwithstanding subsequent dismissal of criminal case."
In line with the law and the positive evidence in this
case it is easy to see why the trial judge held as a matter
of lavv that a full disclosure of all the material facts
bearing on the prosecution was made by the defendants
to Salt Lake County Attorney and that probable cause
for the prosecution existed; and also the further finding
in its opinion that the jury's answer on special verdict
as to questions 2a, 2d, 2£, and 2h and question No. 3
are not supported by the evidence.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the
findings of fact and judgment herein are supported by
clear, positive and uncontr.adicted evidence, that a full
disclosure of all material facts bearing on the prosecution
was made by defendants to the county attorney and that
probable cause for the prosecution existed, and the Findings of Fact and Judgment of the trial court should be
sustained.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF'S CASH BOND COULD NOT BE SET OFF
AGAINST SHORTAGE IN HIS ACCOUNT•.
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The defendants are presenting argument under Point
II in order to substantiate the Deputy County Attorney's
opinion even though it is unnecessary to the decision in
this case according to the authorities heretofore sighted.
Plaintiff's brief under sub-section (b) of Point I
starting at Page 12 again asserts that Exhibit 4, plaintiff's cash bond, vv.as delivered by Mr. Pope to Mr. Taylor
sometime after December 7, 1953. No evidence is furnished to substantiate this statement and it is made by
plaintiff even though both Messrs. Pope and Taylor
stated that this document was delivered to Th1r. Taylor,
studied, explained and analyzed by him prior to .a determination as to probable cause and the signing of the
criminal complaint.
Also, Mr. Taylor in his answer to questions by the
court (R. 158) set out herein stated: "that he did not
think Mr. Cottrell could offset the moneys he collected
under the terms of his contract against his bond, .and,
to that extent, and for that reason, I didn't consider the
amount of the bond particularly important, and don't
recall exactly what the amounts were. But I do recall
we had .a discussion about them, and I knew he had an
amount of money on deposit." That this statement and
opinion is a correct statement of the law is shown by the
following citation:
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20 Corpus Juris, Embezzlement, Sections 50 and 51
hold:
Sec. 50 - "The fact that the embezzler offers
to return or does return what he has fraudulently
converted, or that he or his sureties settled with
the owner, does not b.ar prosecution for embezzlement, the offense being complete at the time of
conversion."
Sec. 51 - "The fact that a defendant has
given an indemnity bond is no defense to the prosecution for embezzlement, nor would it seem, is he
entitled to have it taken into consideration in miti-.
gation of his punishment."
To the same effect is Section 56 of 18 Am. Jur.,
Embezzlement, which holds:
"It is no defense to embezzler that funds were
appropriated in good faith under the belief that
the owner was indebted to embezzler in an ,amount
equal to or greater than, the amount taken.
"The offense is not condoned by giving collateral security."
Also the following cases :
"When principal intrusted property to his
agent for a particular purpose and agent embezzled it, a subsequent offer of agreement to
make restitution did not defeat a prosecution for
embezzlement." (Jorgensen /c. State, 283 N.\v·.,
537 Neb.)
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"One may convert money of another to his
own use by paying it out on his private or personal debts, and the subsequent restoration of the
fund embezzled, or the payment of the shortage
does not expunge or conclusively contradict the
guilt of one who had completed the embezzlen1ent." (McGreever v. State, 300 N.W. 485, Wis.)
Respectfully submitted,
CRITCHLOW, WATSON &
WARNOCK
Counsel for Respondents
1320 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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